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THE RULE-MAKING PROCEDURE OF THE
WISCONSIN PUBLIC SERVICE
COMMISSION
WALLACE MENDELSON*t
I. INTRODUCTION AND TERMINOLOGY
REEDOM to exercise discretion in individual cases, it is submitted,
is the essence of the administrative process. But it is the exercise
of such discretion "especially where it is not in the hands of experts,
operating under quasi-judicial procedures, into which arbitrariness
may creep, and which may furnish a cover for favoritism or even personal spite. In this view the rule-making power may be regarded as
the reintroduction of the rule of law at the administrative level. If
administrative authorities concretize by more specific regulations the
legislative abstractions they are to apply, they canalize their own discretion in individual cases, and minimize the chances of arbitrary discrimination that inheres in such discretion. At the same time they furnish that ability to discount the future that is the principal advantage
of the rule of law." 1
But the rule-making power itself may be exercised arbitrarily. A
principal safeguard against this possibility, however, lies in the requirement of appropriate rule-making procedures.2 How are-such procedures
to be formulated? Some clues for the solution of this problem may be
expected in a study of the procedures of well established administrative agencies. With this conviction the present paper, purporting to be
a "physiological analysis" of the rule-making procedure of the Wisconsin Public Service Commission, has been undertaken. 3
In the exercise of its supervisory and regulatory powers the Commission is authorized in specified cases to issue quasi-legislative rules

F

*Instructor in Political Science, School of Business and Public Administration,
University of Missouri.

t For suggestions and other help in connection with the preparation of this

paper, the author is indebted to Professors Ray A. Brown and Llewellyn
Pfankuchen of the University of Wisconsin and to many members of the
Public Service Commission's staff, especially Mr. W. A. Anderson and
Mr. H. T. Ferguson.

I Hart, J., Some Aspects of Delegated Rule-Making, 25 VA. L. Rzv. 810 (1939).
2 Cf. footnote 12 below.
3 Unless it is expressly otherwise indicated all references to statutes contemplate the Wisconsin Statutes of 1937, as amended by the Session Laws
through the year 1939. References to the Commission's "Rules of Procedure
and Practice," as amended on July 6, 1939, are indicated by the letter "R"
followed by the appropriate rule number.
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and regulations, that is, discretionary rules of conduct of general prospective applicability and legal effecta
For present purposes two distinct categories of such rules and regulations must be recognized, since the procedure of the Commission in
formulating and promulgating those which fall in the one category
differs quite distinctly from its procedure in relation to those in the
other. In the one category are included rules and regulations which
relate to and affect the substantive interests of the persons within the
general classes to which they apply. Rules and regulations of this type
are designated in Commission parlance as "general orders." In the
other category are included those rules and regulations: (1) which
prescribe the procedure to be followed by the Commission and members of the public in the conduct of their official relations with one
another (referred to in the Commission parlance as "rules") , 4 and
(2) those which prescribe the procedure to be followed by Commission
staff members in their official, but purely intra-Commission functions
and activities (referred to in Commission parlance as "instructions").

II. PRocEDuRE RELATING TO GENERAL ORDERS5
a. Scope of the Commission's Authority: The Commission is
authorized by express statutory provision to issue general orders, i.e.,
6
rules of a substantive nature, for a number of specified purposes.
3a

See footnote 6, below.

4 Some confusion enters here due to the fact that Commission rules are promulgated by general orders, for example, the Rides of Procedureand Practice
were promulgated in General Order No. 2.
5 See Keefe, E. J., Ad ministrative Ride-Making and the Courts, 8 FORDHAm L.
REv. 303 (1939) ; Fuchs, N. J., Procedure in Administrative Rule-Making, 52
HARV. L. REV. 259 (1938).
6 Namely, for the purpose of establishing or prescribing: the maximum length
of railroad cars [Wis. STAT. (1939) § 192.14]; suitable partitions for railroad
cars used in the shipment of mixed livestock (§ 192.19) ; reasonable conditions
of employment for, and numbers of employees in, railroad switching crews
(§§ 19226, 195.03.21) ; the location of whistles on locomotives so as to prevent
injury to the hearing of men in the cabs (§ 192.265) ; the safe constructions
of railroad "tell tales" (§ 192.31) ; the installation and use of air brakes in
certain classes of street and interurban railway cars (§ 193.29) ; markings to
identify the several classes of motor carriers (§ 194.09) ; routes and times of
operation for common motor carriers so as to avoid congestion of highways
(§ 194.18-2) and to insure adequate service and prevent unnecessary duplication (§ 194.18-5); hours of labor for common motor carrier drivers
(§ 194.18-5) ; hours of labor for common motor carrier drivers (§ 194.18-8) ;
a uniform system of accounts for common motor carriers (§ 194.30) ; routes
and times of operation for contract motor carriers so as to avoid congestion
of highways (§ 194.36-2); safety regulations, including regulations concerning the hours of labor for drivers of contract motor carriers (§ 194.36-6);
routes and times of operation for private motor carriers (§ 194.43); safety
regulations for private motor carriers (§ 194.43) ; a uniform system of accounts
for railroads to conform as nearly as practicable to that prescribed by Federal
authority for interstate railroads (§ 195.03-11) ; free transportation of attendants for railroad livestock shipments (§ 195.03-14) ; adequate railroad car
service for shippers (§ 195.03-16) ; standards for railroad safety devices and
measures (§ 195.03-18) ; reasonable transfer practices by street and interurban railroads (§ 195.05-7) ; service classifications for public utilities
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As of July 6, 1939 a total of 36 general orders had been promulgated and were in effect. Each order according to its recitals had been
issued pursuant to one or more of the above cited express statutory
authorizations. None of them were predicated simply upon implied
authority or upon -the Commission's general supervisory or regulatory
powers.7
b. The Nature of the Procedure: With one or two exceptions,
where it is provided in the broadest terms that general orders governing specified subjects may be issued after an "investigation" or "hearing," no statutory provisions prescribe the procedure to be followed
by the Commission in formulating or issuing general orders.8
(§ 196.06, 196.10); standard commercial units for public utility products or
services (§ 196.15); standards of measurement of quality, pressure, etc., of
the products or services of utilities and for the accurate measurement thereof
(§196.16) ; conditions under which utilities may make loans to their own officers, or directors, or make loans to or investments in the securities of holding
companies (§ 196.525).
7 A distinguished authority lists the following as requisites of a valid delegation
of legislative power. The delegating legislature must:
"1. itself have power in the premises to regulate.
2. definitely limit the delegation.
3. require, in the case of contingent legislation, a finding.
4. delegate the power to public officers or authorities, not to private persons
or groups.
5. itself provide any penal sanction for violation of resulting rules."
Hart, J., Some Aspects of Delegated Rule-Making, 25 VA. L. REv. 810, 813
(1939).
8 On the question of whether the Fourteenth Amendment requires that hearings be held as a condition precedent to the issuance of an order of this type
see Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v. State Board of Equalization of Colorado,
239 U.S. 441, in which it is said:
"Where a rule of conduct applies to more than a few people, it is impracticable that everyone should have a direct voice in its adoption. The
Constitution does not require all public acts to be done in town meeting
or an assembly of the whole. General statutes within the state power are
passed that affect the person or property of individuals to the point of
ruin, without giving them a chance to be heard. Their rights are protected
in the only way that they can be in a complex society, by their power,
immediate or remote, over those who make the rule."
See also Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. v. Railroad Commission, 188 Wis. 232, 205
N.W. 932, 937 (1925).
Hearings, however are frequently required by statute. "Where the statute
so requires, it should be taken, unless it specifies otherwise, to mean a
legislative hearing analogous to the congressional committee hearings,
rather than a quasi-judicialhearing. Cf. Norwegian Nitrogen Products Co.
v. United States, 288 U.S. 294 (1933), and The Assigned Car Cases, 274
U.S. 564 (1926), with L. & N. R. R. v. Interstate Commerce Commission,
227 U.S. 88 (1913), and Morgan v. United States, 298 U.S. 468 (1936),
304 U.S. 1, 23 (1938). Note especially this statement by Mr. Justice Brandeis in The Assigned Car Cases: 'In the case at bar, the function exercised
by the Commission is wholly legislative. Its authority to legislate is limited
to establishing a reasonable rule. But in establishing a rule of general application, it is not a condition of its validity that there be adduced evidence of
its appropriateness in respect to every railroad to which it will be applicable.
In this connection, the Commission, like other legislators, may reason from
the particular to the general.' In other words, it is never possible to furnish by evidence judicial proof of a universal proposition." Hart, J., Some
Aspects of Delegated Rule-Making, 25 VA. L. REv. 810, 819 (1939).
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Similarly, no such procedure has been formally outlined by the Commission in its Rules of Procedure and Practice, or elsewhere. Thus in
a sense the Commission's practice in these matters is purely informal
and voluntary, yet it is not entirely liquid. On the contrary a fairly
rigid and uniform procedure has been established in practice and what
follows is a description of that procedure based on an examination of
the Commission's general order files plus discussions with staff members.
c. The Instigation of Proceedings: No agency within the Commission's organization is set apart or designated to suggest, consider,
or draft proposed general orders. Rather all members of the staff are
encouraged to call to the attention of the Commission, through its secretary, in written memorandum form, any suggestions in this respect
which he or she may have. This apparently artless device is in fact
designed to encourage the interest of each staff member in the functions of the Commission as well as to secure for the use of the Commission the experience garnered by the staff in its day-to-day official
contacts with the outside world. The effectiveness of this procedure is
indicated in the fact that six or eight suggestions are submitted in this
manner each month and that about 85 per cent of all general orders
originate in such suggestions. 9
The greater part of the remainder of the general orders which the
Commission issues originate, ostensibly at least, on the initiative of the
Commission itself, though even here there can be no doubt that informal suggestions both from the staff and outside are important.
Finally, but relatively seldom, formal suggestions from persons
outside the Commission's organization are responsible for the initiation of the remaining proceedings which result in the issuance of general orders. 10
4. Investigations and Methods of Proceeding Thereafter: Whatever the source, if upon perusal a suggestion is found by the Commission to justify serious consideration, it is routed for investigation to a
staff member within whose particular province the matter lies. The
investigator in each case, having been selected on the basis of his particular qualifications to handle the matters in hand, is ordinarily ex9 See following footnote.

' 0 An examination of the files on all of the public utility and railroad general

orders in effect as of a recent date did not disclose sufficient material to war-

rant the presentation of figures in respect to the origin of proceedings which

culminate in the issuance of general orders. Estimates by staff members of
considerable experience indicate that about 85 per cent of the Commission's
general orders originate on the initiative of the staff, 10 per cent on the initiative of the Commission and the remainder on the initiative of persons on

the outside. It is, of course, clear that there is a great amount of crossfertilization between these three classes which defies calculation.
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pected to draw heavily upon his own expert knowledge and experience
as well as upon such information as may be available in the Commission's files and records. He is likewise expected to consult with his
colleagues in those aspects of the problem which fall in their respective
fields.
Finally, careful study is made in almost every case of the practices
of agencies in other jurisdictions having regulatory powers corresponding to those of the Commission. This has been found to be one
of the most fruitful sources of information available and is constantly
relied upon.
Though investigations of this kind purport to be purely ex parte,
it happens not infrequently that consultations are held with outside
experts, especially those representing the larger companies and the
utility, or other association whose members might be within the purview of the contemplated order. Aside from such associations there
are no established representative, advisory bodies whose assistance
might be sought.
Upon the conclusion of the investigation a written memorandum
embodying the results thereof, together with a draft order where that
is feasible, is submitted to the Commission, which thereupon considers
the same usually in consultation with members of its legal and technical staffs. Then, unless the entire matter is found to be unworthy of
further action, either one of three (or possibly four) courses of procedure may be pursued as follows:
In relatively simple cases where little or no opposition is anticipated,
the draft order, which in such cases will have been prepared by the
investigating staff member, subject, of course, to approval by the Commission, is forthwith promulgated as a final and effective order of the
Commission. Out of a total of 17 general orders of the Commission
only 3 were issued in this manner without hearing"
One of these three required certain telephone companies to secure
Commission approval before installing any telephone exchange switch"These figures, as well as those which follow in this study except where expressly indicated to the contrary, are based on the writer's examination of the
Commission's files on the 13 general orders in effect July 6, 1939 relating to
public utilities and railroads, plus the files on 4 earlier editions of these
orders. Thus the figures herein relate to the proceedings which culminated
in the issuance of 17 general orders. Four orders, effective on the said date,
although designated by the Commission as general orders, have not been
included because they are not in the writer's opinion substantive, quasi- legislative rules of the sort here being considered. Of the four orders thus
omitted one constituted the formal appointment of certain specified persons
to the Commission's staff, one promulgated the Rules of Procedure and Practice, one required utilities to submit specified information on a certain date
for the purpose of enabling the Commission to perform a specific statutory
duty, and one prescribed the procedure to be followed in assessing costs against
the parties in certain proceedings.
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board, or before entering into any call-switching agreement; another
altered certain provisions of the Commission's accounting rules relative to construction overhead costs; and the third required that full
accounting records be kept of all disbursements, in excess of ten dollars, by certain utilities. Incidentally, the order relating to overhead construction costs was issued only after a conference on the matter had
been held between representatives of the Accounting Committee of the
Wisconsin Utilities Association and the Commission's chief accountant.
Where the matter involved is more difficult, but where it is fairly
certain that some form of order is ultimately to be issued, a draft
order, having been drawn up by the investigating staff member, subject
to the approval of the Commission, is sent by registered mail to all
interested parties together with notice of the time and place of a
hearing to be held for the purpose of receiving criticisms and suggestions thereon. Of the 17 general order proceedings which were examined 8 were handled in this manner.
One general order, apparently an exception, was treated in a
hybrid manner which incorporated some of the elements of each of the
foregoing methods of procedure. In this case an order was issued without hearing, but subject to the express proviso that it should not
become effective until twenty days after issuance and not then, if any
interested person should in the interim have filed a petition for a hearing, in which event the effective date was automatically stayed until
final determination after due notice and hearing. One petition for
hearing was received, but it was tempered by a request for an informal
conference with Commission staff experts together with the suggestion
that such a conference might well obviate the necessity of a hearing.
A conference was held, the order was revised and thereupon issued as
an effective Commission order, strangely enough, without notice and
hearing on the revisions which had been made.
The 5 remaining orders out of the 17 which were examined were
issued after hearings held not only to consider what form the ultimate
order in each case should take, but also whether or not any order
should be issued. In these cases no draft orders were prepared by the
in one instance
Commission for consideration at the hearings, though
2
such a draft was submitted by an interested party.'
12Professor Hart suggests the following pre-natal procedural safeguards in
connection with the exercise of delegated legislative powers:
"1. the advisory committee
2. notice and formal hearing
3. publication of draft regulations
4. informal contact with groups affected
5. progression from voluntary to mandatory standards**"
25 VA. L. REv. 810, 819 (1939). See also Hart, The Exercise of Rule-Making
Power,

in
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e. Notice of, and Parties to, General Order Hearings: In all cases
where general order hearings are held notice of the time and place
thereof is given to all interested persons. An examination of the notices
which were issued in the 13 proceedings in which hearings were held
reveals that the average period of time between notice and the date on
which the hearing was scheduled to open was 18.5 days. The shortest
notice given in any case was 10 days.
So too, as has already been indicated, notice of all hearings is published weekly in the official state newspaper.
The term "interested persons" as used in this connection includes
all persons, partnerships, or corporations subject to the Commission's
jurisdiction and conducting the kind of business which falls within the
general class to which the proposed order, if it were to become effective, would apply, together with such other persons as the Commission
might believe would be substantially interested therein. Thus, for
example, in the instance of a hearing on a draft order, by the terms of
which gas companies were required to secure from the Commission a
certificate of authorization before the construction and installation of
any additional plant facilities, notice was sent to every gas utility in the
state subject to the Commission's jurisdiction, to the Wisconsin Utilities Association, and to a number of other persons whose exact interest
in the matter the writer was unable to ascertain.
The same lenient practice with respect to intervenors that applies
in rate and service hearings applies as well in general order hearings.
That is, any person having a legitimate interest in the subject matter,
however indirect, may intervene in the proceeding at any stage before
the record is closed and will thereupon be accorded a status of full
equality with all other parties.
In the 13 hearings to which reference has already been made an
average of 15 appearances per hearing were entered, the maximum
and minimum intervenors being respectively 45 and 4.
f. The Conduct of the Hearings: All of the rules and procedures
pertaining to the conduct of the hearing, the use and selection of
examiners, the functions of Commission counsel and staff members,
the recording of proceedings, the the process of proof, the submitting
of briefs and argument, the mechanics of formulating the final order
and the granting of reopenings and rehearings which apply in rate and
service hearings are applicable pari passu to the conduct of general
order hearings. 12a But hearings in the two types of cases differ considerably in spirit and purpose, this difference being apparent particu12a For a description of the procedure of the Commission in rate and service

hearings see Mendelson, Wallace, The Public Service Commission of Wisconsin: A Study in Administrative Procedure, 1940 Wis. L. REv. 503 (1940).
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larly in the matter of the process of proof. In this respect the rules
and procedure referred to are more applicable than applied. Thus parties, being incidentally more numerous than in other hearings, appear
in general order hearings primarily, it would seem, to present their
views and recommendations in the matter at hand and not to offer
evidence directed toward the exploration of more or less specific issues.
Little effort is made to establish, by the introduction of evidence, facts
material to the problems involved and what testimony there is tends
to be exclusively of the expert opinion variety. In short, hearings on
proposed general orders are in fact conferences of experts conducted
for the purpose of airing opinions and reconciling, as nearly as may be,
by discussion and compromise the differences which necessarily exist
between those who must issue rules and those who must abide by
them. The conference-like nature of general order hearings is exemplified in a recent case where the parties being too numerous to proceed expeditiously en masse, appointed representatives to meet with
staff members of the Commission for the purpose of working out in
committee a draft order to be submitted for adoption by the Commission. Though admittedly this proceeding was exceptional, it epitomizes the spirit which seems to prevail in all general order proceedings.
But the crucial difference between hearings on proposed general
orders and hearings on other matters is not in essence a matter of
procedure. It lies in the fact that in the former the Commission does
not feel obligated, as it does in the latter, to confine itself in formulating
its ultimate order to the evidence contained in the formal record of the
hearing. In short the evidence and arguments of the parties to general
order hearings are regarded simply as advisory, to be considered in
whole, in part, or not at all, in the discretion of the Commission. To
complete the picture it must be said that a comparison of the draft
orders prepared by the Commission as a basis for discussion at hearings with the orders ultimately promulgated discloses the fact that
changes predicated on evidence and arguments of record were made in
every case.
Some of the Commission's general orders are supported by rather
elaborate findings of fact, others with only the most general findings
13
stated in the terms of the statute pursuant to which they are issued.
13 As to the necessity of findings of fact see Pacific States Box & Basket Co.

v. White, 296 U.S. 176 (1935) in which it is said:
"It is contended that the order is void because the administrative body
made no special findings of fact. But the statute did not require special
findings doubtless because the regulation authorized was general legislation,
not an administrative order in the nature of a judgment directed against
an individual concern. Compare Wichita Railroad & Light Co. v. Public
Utilities Commission, 260 U.S. 48, 59-59.**:'
See also U. S. v. Baltimore & Ohio Ry., 293 U.S. 454 (1935); PanamaRefining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935) ; Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States,

295 U.S: 495 (1935).
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Examination of the records made in connection with the 13 hear-

ings on proposed general orders relating to utilities and railroads
throws further light on the nature of general order hearings. In 10
cases the hearings were concluded on the same day on which they were

begun, while in the remaining 3 cases they were opened and closed
within the period of 2 days. The average number of pages per record

transcript was 72.3, the maximum and minimum being respectively
217 and 11. The number of days elapsing between the close of the

hearing and the promulgation of the order was on the average 74.6, the
three shortest intervening periods being respectively 1, 2, and 5 days. 14
The average period of time betwen the date on which notice of 'the
hearing was issued and the date on which the order was promulgated

was 100.9 days, the maximum and minimum being respectively 304 and
13 days. 15
g. The Revision and Cancellationof Orders: For purposes of the
procedure in relation to their origin, -formulation and issuance no distinction whatsoever is drawn between original orders on the one hand
and revisory, or cancelling orders on the other. That is, the procedure
which has already been described applies as much to the latter as to the
former. It follows that the Commission, having no agency specifically
designated to suggest, consider or draft new orders, has none to
examine existing orders, periodically or otherwise, with a view to possible revision or cancellation. But both of these functions are simply
aspects of the problem of keeping general orders "up to date" which
is largely solved, or obviated, in Commission procedure by the practice,
already indicated, of encouraging staff members to submit for Commission consideration any suggestions which they may have, based on
their day-to-day experience in the performance of their duties.
Another method of "revising" orders is that of retaining jurisdiction after the promulgation of an order for the purpose of making
"reasonable changes upon proper application and a showing of good
cause." This device was used in one case where a rather elaborate
order fixing standard guarantee and deposit rules and disconnect procedure for gas, electric and water utilities was issued. Although the
order in that case made no express provision for it, on two occasions
applications were made by groups of two and three utilities, respec14 These figures do not take into account one exceptional case in which a period
of more than three years elapsed between the close of the hearing and the
issuance of the order, the delay in this case being due simply to indecision
as to whether an order ought to be issued.
'* See footnote next preceding. The fact that the average period of notice plus
the average hearing time, plus the average period elapsing between the close
of the hearing and the issuance of the order do not quite equal the average
total period between notice and order is due to the fact that in two instances
hearings were adjourned and then resumed after an interval.
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tively, for special permission to be exempted from a part of the provisions of the order and without hearing or notice to other parties
exemptions were granted to the applicants alone.
h. The Promulgation of Orders: General orders are promulgated
by sending notice of the effective date of each order by registered mail
to all persons, partnerships and corporations within the class to which
it applies, as well as to all other parties who appeared at any hearing
which may have been held thereon. Each notice is accompanied by a
copy of the order to which it relates, the copy being either in typewritten, mimeographed or printed form according to the size of the
class to which it applies. There is no formal publication of orders in
anything corresponding to the Federal Register, though every effort
is made by the Publicity Section to secure as much newspaper publicity as possible. Finally, the subject matter and docket numbers of each
effective order are listed in the sucessive editions of the Commission's
Rules of Procedure and Practice, and copies of all orders are made
available upon request at the Commission's main office.
Ordinarily, orders do not become effective until after the expiration of a fixed period of time subsequent to the dates of their respective
notices, the duration of such period in each case depending upon the
nature of the order in question.
Revisory and cancelling orders receive like treatment, of course, in
all respects.
III.

PROCEDURE RELATING TO RULES

a. Scope of the Commission's Authority: As we have already seen,
in Commission nomenclature the term "rules" is reserved for that class
of quasi-legislative rules and regulations which prescribe the procedure
to be followed by the Commission and members of the public in the
conduct of their official relations with one another. The Commission's
power to issue such rules is predicated upon the express statutory provisions which authorize it to prescribe the form of applications for
common motor carrier certificates and contract motor carrier licenses
[WIs. STAT. (1939) §§ 194.24, 194.35], "to adopt rules to govern its
proceedings and to regulate the mode and manner of all investigations
and hearings" [§195.03-(1)], to issue rules concerning the reporting
of railroad accidents [§195.34], "to adopt reasonable rules and regulations relative to all inspections, tests, audits and investigations"
[§196.02-(3)], and to prescribe rules to govern applications for rehearings in utility rate and service proceedings [§196.405] .16
16 Many of the numerous statutory provisions which require the submission

to the Commission of various types of information authorize the Commission
to prescribe the form in which such information shall be submitted and the
manner and time of submitting it. As of July 6, 1939 this jurisdiction had been,
exercised by the Commission only once.
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All rules in effect as of July 6, 1939 were issued, according to the
recitals in the orders by which they were promulgated, pursuant to
that statutory provision just quoted which authorizes the Commission
"to adopt rules to govern its proceedings and to regulate the mode and
manner of all investigations and hearings." In fact it would seem that
this provision is comprehensive enough to justify the statement that any
rule which the Commission might adopt could be said to be predicated
on express statutory authority.
b. The Formulation of Rules: No statutory provision prescribes
the procedure to be followed by the Commission in formulating and
issuing rules and prior to 1938 no such procedure had been established
in practice, since before then rules had been issued on only two occasions, once in 1908 and once in 1932, the procedure used in each instance being purely ad hoc.'7 In 1938, however, on the instigation of its
then newly appointed secretary a procedure was established for formulating rules and continuously scrutinizing them with a view toward revision where that might be found advisable in the light of new experience or altered circumstances. Pursuant to the new procedure the
Commission's Rules of Procedure and Practice were issued on Jan.
uary 26, 1938 and revised on July 6, 1939.
Although it has been nowhere explicitly formulated, the outlines of
the new procedure for the making of rules are quite clear and may be
described as follows. As in the case of the formulation of general
orders, all staff members are encouraged to submit suggestions in
memorandum form for the improvement of existing practice. For the
purpose of considering such suggestions the Commissioners, the Commission's secretary and assistant-secretary meet periodically with the
department chiefs, section supervisors and examiners. Such meetings,
referred to as "procedure meetings," are called by the Commission's
secretary whenever he has reason to believe on the basis of memoranda
received that there is sufficient business at hand to warrant the calling
thereof. Until the issuance of the revisory rules of July 6, 1939 procedure meetings were held about once a month; since then they have
occurred less frequently.
During the course of a meeting on the basis of an agenda prepared
in advance by the Commission's secretary the suggestions from the
staff, together with those which may have been received from outside,
either formally or informally, are discussed in some detail. Where more
thorough consideration is necessary to dispose of any matter so raised
a staff member may be appointed to make an investigation and submit
the results thereof, together with his recommendations, at a subsequent
'v

The rules of 1908 were comprehensive in nature, but they were never revised
and by 1932 had long since been abandoned in practice, if not in theory.
Those of 1932 related only to applications for rehearing.
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meeting. So, too, staff members who do not regularly attend procedure
meetings but whose functions or experience may be expected to qualify
them as experts on the matter in hand may be called upon to attend
particular meetings to consult with the regular attendants.
On occasion, criticisms and suggestions from interested persons on
the outside are solicited for consideration at procedure meetings. For
example, after the Rules of Procedure and Practice of January 26,
1938 had been in effect for a little more than a year examiners who
had conducted proceedings thereunder were asked to prepare a list of
the names of all lawyers who had participated in such proceedings.
Form letters requesting advice as to the manner in which those rules
might be improved were then sent to all the lawyers so listed. The
responses received together with suggestions from staff members were
the foundation for the revised rules of July 6, 1939.
An interesting example of how procedure meetings work may be
seen in the origin of the Commission's Rule 10b which provides in
respect to hearings that "Before appearances are entered the presiding
commissioner or examiner shall make a concise statement of the scope
and purpose of the hearing." In this instance the Commission's
assistant-secretary, being well aware of the difficulties resulting from
the absence in Commission procedure of any machinery for clarifying
the issue to be "tried" at Commission hearings, noticed a newspaper
article which indicated that a similar problem had been solved by a
regulatory agency in another jurisdiction through the device of an
opening statement by the presiding official. The matter was immediately
brought up for discussion at a procedure meeting, where it was decided
that the device ought to be tried in a few hearings before any definite
action was taken thereon. Thig was done and the results, incidentally
having proven tremendously successful, were reported back at a subsequent procedure meeting where it was resolved that an opening statement by examiners ought to be adopted as part of the Commission's
regular procedure for the purpose of delineating the issues to be dealt
with at hearings.
c. The Promulgation of Rules: It is, of course, clear that the participants in procedure meetings as such have no power to issue legally
effective rules. They simply make recommendations in resolution form
to be accepted or rejected by the Commission in its discretion. It goes
without saying, however, that since the Commissioners actively participate in all procedure meetings, the recommendations resulting therefrom are as a matter of course always adopted by the Commission.
As has been indicated, Commission rules are promulgated by the
issuance of a "general order," copies of which are sent to all lawyers
who the Commission files indicate have participated in Commission
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proceedings in the preceeding year or so, and to libraries and other institutions which might be interested therein. Copies of the Supplemental
Order of July 6, 1939 which revised the Rules of Procedure and Practice of about eighteen months earlier, for example, were sent to one
hundred and fifteen persons and institutions.
Printed copies of all effective rules are also made available upon
request at the Commission's main office in much the same manner as
are rules of judicial courts of record.

IV. PROCEDURE RELATING TO INSTRUCTION
a. Scope of the Commission's Authority: No statutory provision
has been found which in express terms authorizes the Commission to
issue instructions, i.e., rules of conduct prescribing the procedure to be
followed by staff members in their official, but purely intra-Commission, activities. This mafter, however, need not long detain us, since it
must be perfectly clear that the Commission has ample authority in this
respect by implication in conjunction with the extensive powers which
have been granted it by express statutory provision.
b. The Formulationand Issuance of Instructions: In addition to
suggestions relating to rules, suggestions relating to instructions are
also received and considered at procedure meetings. In fact, the procedure in respect to the one is in all respects identical with that in
respect to the other except in the matter of issuance. The difference
in the latter regard lies in the fact that instructions are issued on the
authority of the participants in procedure meetings as such and are not
formally acted upon by the Commission as a separate entity. Thus, at
the close of procedure meetings any instructions which may have been
adopted are put into mimeographed form and distributed to all staff
members who may be effected thereby.

